Lebanese Shiites increasingly favor state control of weapons

New survey data released in mid-October suggests that a significant portion of Lebanon's Shi'ite population is reconsidering its stance on Hezbollah's military independence. The findings, which have drawn attention from regional media, indicate that the community that has historically served as the movement's political base is increasingly open to the idea of consolidating military power under the Lebanese state. This shift represents a notable departure from previous sentiment and could have profound implications for the country's security architecture and political balance.

The data comes from a poll conducted in September by Statistics Lebanon, which surveyed 800 Lebanese Shi'ites. The results show that 66.4% of respondents supported handing over Hezbollah's weapons to the Lebanese state, while 29.6% preferred that the group retain its arsenal. Hezbollah has long maintained that its weapons are a necessary deterrent against Israel, but these figures suggest that a majority within its core demographic is now leaning toward a centralized military command.

Further details reported by Kataeb.org, the online platform of the opposition Christian Kataeb Party, highlight a broader desire for state authority. According to the report, 71.1% of those surveyed believed that decisions regarding war and peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese government. In contrast, only 5.9% argued that Hezbollah's leadership should play a larger role in shaping the nation's future direction. This preference for state sovereignty aligns with high levels of confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Trust in the national military appears robust within the community. Approximately 78.5% of respondents expressed confidence in the army, and 51.1% identified it as the institution best positioned to ensure long-term security. By comparison, only 16.5% selected Hezbollah for that role. These numbers challenge the group's traditional narrative that it is the primary guardian of the security interests of Lebanon's Shi'ites.

Despite the shift toward state authority, opinions on Hezbollah's performance in the recent conflict were mixed. Some 67.4% of respondents indicated that the group had either failed to achieve its goals in the war with Israel or had only partially succeeded. Additionally, 42.1% expressed disappointment, anger, or concern regarding the leadership and the consequences of the conflict. Nevertheless, a majority still maintained a level of trust in the organization.

Specifically, 59.5% of respondents reported having some degree of trust in Hezbollah, with 37.1% stating they had a great deal of trust. Roi Kais from Israel's public broadcaster KAN noted that the support networks and status Hezbollah has established within the sect continue to sustain its strength, provided that no other entity steps in to fill the resulting vacuum. This suggests that while dissatisfaction is growing, the organizational glue holding the community together remains intact for now.

The current findings stand in stark contrast to earlier data. In a May 2026 survey by Lebanon's Information International, cited by researchers Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, 87.5% of Shi'ite respondents opposed disarming Hezbollah. Only 7.9% supported surrendering its weapons in that earlier poll. The significant gap between the two sets of results raises questions about whether changes in survey wording or agenda influenced the outcomes.

Mizrahi and Levanoni argued that Hezbollah's enduring influence is rooted in its social and economic networks, its political clout, and the historical marginalization of Lebanon's Shi'ites. They also pointed to the role of intimidation in discouraging open dissent. They contended that weakening the group would require a stronger Lebanese army, supported by Western and Gulf financial aid, so that the state could eventually replace the services Hezbollah currently provides.

Local indicators also suggest a degree of wariness. In the southern city of Tyre, property owners reportedly resisted the opening of a branch of Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a financial institution linked to Hezbollah, due to fears it might be targeted in an Israeli strike. Such branches have been hit in the past. In response to the destruction caused by the new war that began in March 2026, Hezbollah announced aid packages of up to $14,000 for families in Beirut and its southern suburbs and up to $12,000 elsewhere. Whether this discontent translates into lasting political change will likely depend on the state's ability to provide security, reconstruction, and economic stability.